Violence, Terrorists and Cults, Oh My!

A Review of Motivation Factors in the Radicalization and Violent Actions of New Religious Movements and Terrorist Organization Members

Daniella Mestyanek Young

Behavioral and Psychological Sciences, Harvard University

“Daniella, why do people join cults?” is a question that has been directed at me, and which I have been trying to answer for the past almost-20 years. I get asked because, well, I grew up in cult Later on, I became an intelligence officer in the US Army and deployed twice in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, studying terrorist groups—their networks, motivations and tactics—so that I could help our guys avoid the ‘bad guys’. I began to notice not only the parallels between cults and terrorist groups, but between groups of all kinds. For this analytical review of a topic in the field of the psychology of motivation, I focused on my interest of the motivation behind why people commit violence on behalf of ideals—something which can be found throughout our world in many forms, including while serving one’s country honorably in uniform. I’ll be reviewing, The Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists: Opening a Dialogue, written by Lorne L. Dawson, a Full Professor in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies and the Department of Religious Studies at Canada’s University of Waterloo, in 2010. The article was published in the journal of Terrorism and Political Violence.

This intent of the above listed article is to take a look at the reasons for, and absence of, a dialogue in between scholars of New Religious Movements (NRMs), often colloquially referred to as cults, and scholars of terrorism, political violence, extremism and radicalization. I have chosen to analyze this article from the perspective of a motivation psychology lens, as there is an underlying claim in the article that the motivation of those who join and remain in NRMs and those who join/remain in terrorist organizations shares similar psychological bases, as well as that the processes of radicalization—which rely heavily on motivation psychology—are similar in nature, an argument that I have myself come to realize through both my lived experience and the research that I have been doing at Harvard as I pursue my Master’s degree in Organizational Psychology.

Article claims:

A review of the 20-page article, breaks down into 4 major claims that deal with motivation. The first is that there are significant parallels between the motivation factors observed in those who join NRMs and those who become radicalized into terrorist organizations. Secondly, that there are, potentially, significant parallels between the processes of radicalization into both cults and violent terrorist organizations, especially those which are religiously based. Third, that the movement towards homegrown domestic terrorism could be better understood by a cross-dimensional look at what motivates cult-members, especially from those NRMs that have turned to mass-violence. Finally, that the rhetoric of mind-control or brainwashing is too simplistic and obscures our ability to discern the patterns that occur to produce radicalization in both types of groups.

Main Ideas Related to Weapons of Influence/Motivation

Scholars of NRMs initially believed that those who ‘forsook all’ to join these movements were suffering real or relative deprivation, but the student movements of the 1960s-70s put those ideas to rest; parallels to this can be seen in the Arab Spring movement and the increasing radicalization of ‘home-grown terrorists’ who come from all kinds of backgrounds and standards of living. As study of ‘cults’ progressed, scholars began to realize that the idea of ‘relative deprivation’, while plausible on the surface, had too many counter-examples to be considered scientifically significant, and that the definition itself “allows for too much interpretive flexibility” to be useful (Dawson, 2010). Dawson instead posits several other reasons behind why people might join NRMs or terrorist organizations.

These include, 1) those who have fewer social attachments—giving them lower stakes in conformity, “hence they are more available for recruitment to groups that are in high tension or philosophical conflict with society” (Dawson, 2010). This motivation is a reflection of social-proof theory, which according to Robert B Cialdini, PhD, in his book, Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion is that “one means we use to determine what is correct is to find out what other people think is correct” (Cialdini, 2007). It is reasonable to assume that those with fewer social attachments have a void of more ‘normal’ kinds of social proof that will counter some of their growing extreme beliefs.

Another reason behavioral scientists that study each group have found to have significance is 2) that motivation to join NRMs or terrorist groups may indeed be the pull of romantic or comradely love, and as such ‘religious identity’ motivation may be at play here, with individuals who are ‘seekers’ being pulled to search for their ‘true self’, surrounded with others who think like them. There is an aspect of Liking theory at play here, as these recruits are often drawn into the radicalization process by likeable individuals whom they desire to emulate.

A third motivational factor is that 3) the rise of a charismatic leader, generally accepted as necessary for NRMs and terrorist groups to become radicalized to conduct real mass-violence, has a pseudo-spiritual quality to it, tapping into the same motivation factors that draws people to ‘normal religions’, whether the group in question is technically a religious organization or not. As one researcher of Islamic terrorist groups in Pakistan points out, “When I began this project, I could not understand why killers I met seemed spiritually intoxicated. Now, I think I understand. They seem that way because they are” (Dawson, 2010).

Article Strengths

Lorne L. Dawson makes a strong case that “Scholars studying new religious movements, or “cults” in common parlance, have noted parallels between their work and findings and research on Islamic terrorism, and other forms of political radicalism for decades, but more specifically since 9/11” (Dawson, 2010). The idea that these ‘twenty-first century “domestic terrorists” and the cult members moved to violence in the latter part of the twentieth century are motivated by similar factors is well borne out in the article and supported by his research; it is further supported by what we know about terrorists and the processes of radicalization and extremism in 2021.  

The author makes a strong case for the motivational factors at work on both seemingly disparate categories of people, and does an adequate, though not very detailed, description of the parallels between the groups. These factors include, as reviewed above, social proof theory, religious identity motivation and the pull of romantic/comradely love, and authority willingly granted under the influence of a charismatic leader. The author successfully shows that “(p)eople are active participants in their own conversion and resocialization, not the passive victims of exploitative leaders” (Dawson, 2010). He argues that we must contextualize it such in order to get past the inflammatory rhetoric and ideas associated with mind-control or ‘brainwashing’ and understand the process as a process of resocialization and programming, that happens in other contexts as well. Several conflicts, he points out, to the cross-dimensional study of these groups are that most NRM scholars are reluctant to cross boundaries because they are not adequately trained in Islam and the Middle East, while those busy studying the terrorists are focused, understandably, on developing lists of ‘indicators’ and ‘signatures’ but are, as such,  failing to properly understand the significance that a broader understanding of the parallels would bring to the fight in counterterrorism.

The author spends most of his time examining the link between a concept of identity, specifically group identity, and its links to belief in a ‘sacred’, even if not in what we would consider a strictly religious context. The author links the sacred beliefs to the motivation to believe in an apocalypse or pending world-ending event of some kind, and how charismatic leaders can drive that force. The argument that those who commit mass acts of violence, and the process that this generally takes, are linked through their concept of group identity to participate in their own radicalization is borne out by his examples of when they reach the extremes, as is borne out in NRMs, which prior to 9/11 had the largest examples of mass-violence in a Western context, and terrorist groups, which dominate the mass-violence occurrences in the post-9/11 era.

Article Weaknesses

The scholar who authored the paper, Lorne L. Dawson, is a scholar of NRMs and does not have much experience in the study of terrorism; additionally, there is not much of an extant dialogue between these types of scholars. Dawson acknowledges this as a weakness in his understanding of the depth of the parallels between the two categories. Part of the purpose of his paper, is stated in the title, “Opening a Dialogue”. The author believes that there is a lack of knowledge of the depth of parallels between these groups, and that scholarship would be much enhanced by cross-disciplinary study. I believe that it is even more important in the context of current events in 2021.

Another serious limitation of this kind of study is that we generally do not have unfettered access to cult members or members of terrorist organizations, so it can be difficult to get enough information of their ‘true motivations’ in order to truly denote the parallels in the processes of radicalization. Dawson recognizes this and reminds scholars in the field that “(w)e must remember an old adage: no one joins a “dangerous cult” or a “terrorist cell.” Converts invariably see the act of joining in positive terms, as beneficial for both themselves, their society, and the cosmos, (literally), and the process is far more gradual than it appears” (Dawson, 2010). Additionally, there is a lack of information and knowledge as to whether the motivation of those who join these groups and then leave, as 90% do, differs significantly from those who join and never leave—whom scholars are much less likely to have unfettered access to.

Because of the Dawson’s lack of familiarity with terrorist organizations, he makes the statement that “terrorist groups are violent by design” (Dawson, 2010), which he contrasts with NRMs which must go through a process to become that way. With my background in both NRMs and terrorism, I would argue that terrorist groups, at least those with the strongest parallels to violent NRMs, do not start as terrorist groups either, but ideological political (and often religious) movements, and become radicalized to violence in much the same way as an NRM might. A case study of Bin Laden’s radicalization and the creation of Al Qaeda would support this point of view. The case for motivation psychology parallels could be strengthened with a deeper look at the motivations behind terrorist radicalization to the same level as the author does for those who join NRMs.

Room for Future Research

Some gaps in the paper are, 1) the author lists the pre 9/11 incidences of mass violence well, but missed the blood atonement murders of the fundamentalist branch of the Mormons in the 90s, which I would advise be reviewed for inclusion in any comparative research on this topic. For reference, the groups/events he does consider are:

·       the mass suicide-murder of the People’s Temple in Guyana in 1978

·       The tragic siege of the Branch Dividians in Waco 1993

·       The Solar Temple murder-suicides in Quebec, Switzerland, and France in

1994, 1995, and 1997

·       The Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995

·       The struggles with right-wing fundamentalist militia groups, like those

involved in the Christian Identity movement, which led to the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in 1995

·       The collective suicide of Heaven’s Gate in San Diego in 1997

Another gap 2) is, other than references to 9/11 and other incidences of Islamic-inspired terrorism, the author doesn’t give a subsequent list of terrorist events to consider in parallel with the NRM violence listed above, weakening his argument. There is room for future research in this area, especially in 2021, with the resurgence of violent home-grown extremist groups, white supremacist violence, and other socio-politically influenced extremist-turned violent movements

            From a discussion of the reasons for a dialogue between scholars of New Religious Movements and scholars of Home-Grown Terrorism in the introduction to the paper, a review of why the dialogue had not taken place as of 2010 in a major way, and a call for action in the Lessons Learned section of the paper, Dawson calls for more cross-disciplinary research in this area, a need that is more vital than ever in the recent experiences with domestic terrorism and home-grown radicalization into a variety of extremist groups being seen at scale taking place in the United States in 2021. Dawson calls for more qualitative and ethnographic research, which has proven quite helpful in his field, to be done in the research of radicalization into terrorist and violent political organizations, while also reminding researchers not to “come prejudiced to the equal need for developing a sense of the generic features of these groups, and the processes of radicalization.” To my knowledge, there is still a dearth of research into the parallels of these two disparate fields of research, which may guide me to where I should focus my work in the future.

In conclusion, I found the article The Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists: Opening a Dialogue by Lorne L. Dawson, taking a look at the parallels between the why’s and how’s of why individuals might join new religious movements or terrorist organizations to be a strong argument and an insightful look into the psychology of motivation. Reviewing the article in tandem with recent work I have done with Robert Cialdini’s weapons of influence and other research into the psychology of motivation, prior study of terrorist groups as an US Army intelligence officer, & my own lived experience in a recognized cult, I find there to be support for the argument that radicalization into either type of group is a process that those who become radicalized engage in more willingly than is often assumed by those unfamiliar with these groups. Furthermore, I agree that much more cross-disciplinary study should be done by scholars who consider these two types of groups in tandem.

References:

Cialdini, R.B (2007) INFLUENCE: The Psychology of Persuasion. Harper-Collins.

Dawson, L. L. (2010) The Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of

Home-Grown Terrorists: Opening a Dialogue. Terrorism and Political Violence,

22:1, 1-21, DOI: 10.1080/0954655090340916